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Exploring the Effects of Union–NGO Relationships on 
Corporate Responsibility: The Case of the Swedish Clean 
Clothes Campaign 
 
Abstract 
In the current era, governments are playing smaller roles in regulating workers’ rights 
internationally, and transnational corporations (TNCs), non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) involved in the struggle for workers’ rights, and labour/trade 
unions have started to fill this governance gap. This paper focuses on the least 
researched of the relationships among these three actors, the union–NGO relationship, 
by analysing the ways in which it affects definitions of TNC responsibility for 
workers’ rights at their suppliers’ factories. Based on a qualitative study of the union–
NGO relationship in the Swedish garment industry between 1996 and 2005, we 
propose that there are six main configurations of union–NGO relationships. By 
linking these configurations to their effects on TNC responsibility, we propose that 
co-ordination relationships between unions and NGOs, particularly high-commitment 
co-ordination relationships, are likely to result in a broadening of the definition of 
TNC responsibility, while conflictual relationships, both high and low commitment, 
result in a narrowing of the definition of TNC responsibility. The study indicates that 
co-operation is generally more beneficial for both unions and NGOs than is any form 
of conflictual relationship, in terms of broadening the definition of TNC 
responsibility.  
 
KEY WORDS: Clean Clothes Campaign; corporate responsibility; garment industry; 
labour practice; multinational corporation; non governmental organisation; 
transnational corporation; supplier relation; union. 
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Introducing the Union–NGO Relationship 
Integral to the ongoing internationalisation of business is the increasing impact of so-
called transnational corporations (TNCs) (e.g., Anderson and Cavanagh, 1996; 
Korten, 2001). One result of this development has been a set of new challenges 
regarding TNC responsibility for workers’  rights at their suppliers’  factories – a 
subset of the broader dialogue regarding TNCs' social responsibility. These challenges 
arose in the 1990s after TNCs experienced legitimacy crises due to extensive NGO 
and union campaigns and various media ‘scandals’  related to the working conditions 
at their suppliers’  factories (Frenkel, 2001; van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; Roberts, 2003; 
Frenkel and Kim, 2004). In response to the criticism, TNCs started to extend their 
responsibility for workers’  rights at their suppliers’  factories in developing countries 
(Emmelhainz and Adams, 1999; Kolk and van Tulder, 2002; Sethi, 2002; Radin, 
2004). The main actors involved in specifying and defining this extended sense of 
responsibility were TNCs, NGOs active in promoting workers’  rights, and 
labour/trade unions (e.g., Christmann and Taylor, 2002; Frenkel and Scott, 2002; 
Sullivan, 2003; Frenkel and Kim, 2004; Prieto and Quinteros, 2004). Hence, these 
specification and definition processes can be characterised as instances of 
‘governance without government’ , aimed at filling the governance gaps left by 
governmental retreat from international issues of corporate responsibility (Beck, 
1992; Rosenau, 1992; Strange, 1996). 
As instances of governance without government have become increasingly 
common, academic interest in these phenomena has grown. The relationship between 
TNCs and NGOs seems to be particularly ‘fashionable’  in corporate responsibility 
research (e.g., Henriques, 2001; Rondinelli and London, 2003; Argenti, 2004; 
Hamann and Acutt, 2004; Teegen et al., 2004). Issues regarding the relationship 
between TNCs and unions have also attracted extensive research attention in the 
management literature (e.g., Piazza, 2002; Weston and Lucio, 1998; Wills, 2002), 
though they have been virtually absent from the corporate responsibility and business 
ethics literature (Michalos, 1997; Leahy, 2001). However, the third relationship, the 
one between NGOs and unions, has attracted little research interest. What little 
relevant research there has been has mainly comprised reflections of practitioners 
involved in the relationships (e.g., Hale, 2004; Ortez, 2004; Simpkins, 2004) or 
conceptual papers (e.g., Braun and Gearhart, 2004), leading to a lack of empirically 
grounded knowledge of the nature and characteristics of the relationships between 
unions and NGOs. In addition, the effect of union–NGO relationships on definitions 
of corporate responsibility has been almost completely ignored. While several authors 
have noted the potential importance of union–NGO relationships regarding the 
definition of TNC responsibility for workers’  rights at suppliers’  factories (e.g., 
O’ Rourke, 2003; Eade, 2004; Frenkel and Kim, 2004), few authors have approached 
the subject systematically. The frequency and importance of these union–NGO 
relationships will also likely increase in the future (cf. Braun and Gearhart, 2004; 
Eade, 2004; Hale, 2004), since the number of NGOs active in workers’  rights has 
grown significantly in recent decades (Boli and Thomas, 1999) and unions have been 
struggling with declining membership and reduced political and economic influence 
(Wills, 1998; Connor, 2004; Eade, 2004). Hence, NGOs are emerging as alternative 
representatives of workers’  rights, alongside unions.  
This paper addresses this research gap by analysing what effects, if any, 
union–NGO relationships have on the definition of TNC social responsibility. In 
answering this question, we make use of an explorative study of the evolving 
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responsibility of Swedish garment retailers for workers’  rights at their suppliers’  
factories between 1996 and 2005 (Ählström and Egels-Zandén, 2005). We 
demonstrate that the relationship between unions and NGOs can be expected to be 
pivotal for the definition of TNC responsibility for workers’  rights. By explicitly 
focusing on the relationship between NGOs and unions, and its impact on TNC 
responsibility, we also hope to contribute to a better understanding of the role of 
unions in the field of business ethics. 
In the next section, we construct a preliminary frame of reference for the 
union–NGO relationship, as derived from previous research. Then, we provide a 
chronological description of how the union–NGO relationship has affected TNC 
responsibilities in the studied case. Based on this, in the final sections of the paper we 
categorise available union–NGO relationship strategies, and link these to predicted 
effects on TNC responsibility. This enables us to arrive at several propositions 
regarding the effect of union–NGO relationships on TNC responsibilities. 
Framing the Union–NGO Relationship  
Based on a review of previous research into union–NGO relationships, we argue that 
there are two distinct outlooks on these relationships: i) conflict and competition, and 
ii) co-ordination and co-operation. In the first, the relationships are constructed as 
detrimental and essentially cannibalising workers’  rights. Here, NGO activities are 
seen as substituting for union activities. Roman (2004), for example, claims that NGO 
involvement in workers’  rights issues risks crowding out union involvement. 
Likewise, Lipschutz (2004) describes NGO involvement as undermining and delaying 
‘proper’  legal regulation of workers’  rights. The argument underlying this outlook is 
based on the notion that workers’  rights and interests can only be protected through 
collective bargaining and legal institutions, not by rights unilaterally extended to 
workers by TNCs (e.g., Justice, 2003). The second outlook, in contrast, argues that 
NGO activities complement union activities. This viewpoint holds that unions and 
NGOs can exert their combined power over TNCs by co-operating, and that their 
activities fulfil different purposes in different contexts. In this way, NGO involvement 
contributes both to improving workers’  rights and to bolstering union influence (cf. 
Connor, 2004; Hale, 2004). 
Using these two outlooks, we argue that the relationship between unions and 
NGOs can be analysed as an issue of co-ordination, and that the choice of conflict or 
co-ordination can be seen as a first-order strategic choice for unions and NGOs. There 
are indications in previous research that unions are likely to choose conflict as their 
default strategy, while NGOs, on the other hand, are likely to choose co-ordination as 
theirs. For example, Justice (2003) and Braun and Gearhart (2004) describe the 
industrial relations approach espoused by unions as based on a ‘win–lose’  mindset of 
competing interests, whereas the logic underlying the Corporate Social Responsibility 
discourse espoused by NGOs is based on a ‘win–win’  scenario of shared ideals. In 
addition, unions are often portrayed as: i) unwilling to contribute any of their 
legitimacy to methods that may benefit a TNC’ s public image (Connor, 2004), and ii) 
tending to behave in a protectionist manner, focusing solely on the workers they 
represent and not necessarily adopting a solidarity approach (Traub-Werner and 
Carvey, 2002; Anner and Evans, 2004). Both these views support the notion that 
unions are likely to choose conflict as their default strategy. However, Connor (2004), 
among others, also presents findings that contradict these hypotheses. He argues that 
union collaboration with NGOs allows them to reach a broader audience, which 
provides them with an incentive to use a co-ordination strategy. Also, Compa (2004) 
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finds that different unions adopt different approaches to collaboration with NGOs, 
some choosing co-ordination while others choose conflict. It has also been shown that 
in instances of weak union presence in a particular geographical region, unions may 
look more favourably on co-ordination strategies (Utting, 2001). Altogether, the 
findings of prior research are mixed regarding the propensities of unions and NGOs to 
choose a co-ordination or conflict strategy towards one another, with a slight tendency 
to characterise unions as choosing a conflict strategy and NGOs a co-ordination 
strategy.  
The following discussion is based on two assumptions. First, unions and 
NGOs active in the workers’  rights field share the same objective, namely, 
influencing TNCs to increase their responsibility for workers’  rights at their suppliers’  
factories (cf. Braun and Gearhart, 2004; Compa, 2004; Roman, 2004). Second, unions 
and NGOs are equally effective at achieving this objective.1 
Method 
In order to analyse the strategic choices of unions and NGOs and to outline how these 
choices affect definitions of TNC responsibility for workers’  rights, we make use of 
data from an explorative study. This study examined the redefinition of Swedish 
garment retailers’  responsibility for workers’  rights at their suppliers’  factories 
between 1996 and 2005 (Ählström and Egels-Zandén, 2005). Given that union–NGO 
relationships are not well understood, our reliance on a qualitative study is in line with 
previously proposed methods (e.g., Marshall and Rossman, 1995; Lee, 1999; Maguire 
et al., 2004).  
Data for the study were collected mainly through interviews and written 
documentation. Between 2002 and 2005, 32 interviews were conducted with key 
actors involved in defining garment retailers’  corporate social responsibilities. These 
include six interviews with representatives of Swedish unions, fourteen interviews 
with various NGOs, and twelve interviews with TNC representatives. Those 
interviewed were responsible for corporate social responsibility issues in their 
organisations and personally involved in the studied redefinition process. The 
interviews lasted on average an hour each and were semi-structured. The written 
documentation (reports, newspaper articles, and web pages) was mainly used to 
validate the information obtained in interview. Few inconsistencies were found 
between the information obtained from the verbal and the written sources.  
The collected data were used to construct a chronological representation of the 
definition process, based on a coding conducted by the two authors. The authors then 
identified the positions adopted by TNCs, NGOs, and unions at each decision point in 
the chronological representation of the process, and each decision’ s effects on 
specified TNC social responsibilities. Then, an earlier version of the empirical section 
was sent to the interviewed representatives, in order to validate the description of the 
definition process. Finally, the interviewees’  suggested changes (only a handful in all) 
were incorporated into the final description of the definition process.  
The Rise and Fall of the Swedish Clean Clothes Campaign, 1996–
2005 
Prologue: The international scene prior to 1996 
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw traditional European- and US-based TNCs start 
offshoring and outsourcing much of their production to developing countries (e.g., 
Jones, 2005; Taylor, 2005). This trend was particularly visible in low-skilled 
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industries, such as the garment, footwear, and toy industries (e.g., Christerson and 
Appelbaum, 1995; Hathcote and Nam, 1999). However, from a European and US 
perspective, working conditions in developing countries were poor (cf. Chan and 
Senser, 1997; Chan, 1998, 2000; Lee, 1998, 1999), leading to negative reactions to 
offshoring on the part of both NGOs and unions (van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; Roberts, 
2003; Frenkel and Kim, 2004). These reactions were based on the argument that 
production could be offshored and outsourced, but not corporate responsibility. In the 
aftermath of a number of international media ‘scandals’  in the early 1990s, TNCs 
such as Levi’ s, GAP, Nike, and Reebok started to acknowledge an extended sense of 
responsibility for workers’  rights at their suppliers’  factories (e.g., Braun and 
Gearhart, 2004). Despite this international controversy, few voices regarding TNC 
responsibility for their suppliers’  workers were raised in Sweden until 1996. 
Act I, 1996–1999: Starting up 
In 1996, the recently founded Swedish NGO, Fair Trade Center (FTC), made contact 
with the Dutch Clean Clothes Campaign and decided to initiate a Swedish Clean 
Clothes Campaign (SCCC), to pressure Swedish garment retailers to extend their 
responsibility for workers’  rights at their suppliers’  factories. The people behind FTC 
were able to convince seven other NGOs, such as Red Cross Sweden Youth and the 
SAC Syndicalists, to join the campaign. As with the Dutch campaign, FTC considered 
the inclusion of unions in this campaign as essential to its success, since Swedish 
unions have traditionally played a key role in negotiations with Swedish garment 
retailers regarding workers’  rights. The two unions involved in the garment industry, 
the Commercial Employees’  Union and the Industrial Workers’  Union, also decided 
to join the campaign. With the inclusion of the unions in SCCC, the campaign 
commenced. 
At this time, the unions claimed not to have developed a position regarding 
workers’  rights issues outside Sweden. Also, few resources had been allocated to 
address these issues, illustrated by the fact that the combined unions had less than one 
full-time position devoted to them. The unions, however, perceived the cause of 
workers’  rights to be tightly linked to international issues and sympathised with the 
aims of SCCC. Inspired by FTC’ s enthusiasm, they decided to join the campaign.  
Campaign activities started off with a postcard campaign, proposed and 
directed by FTC, targeting the shoppers at four of Sweden’ s largest garment retailers: 
Hennes & Mauritz (H&M), Lindex, KappAhl, and Indiska.2 The idea was that 
consumers would pressure the retailers into extending their corporate social 
responsibilities to encompass the operations of their foreign suppliers. At the same 
time, FTC, through SCCC, made contact with the four retailers, with the aim of 
persuading them to adopt codes of conduct regarding workers’  rights at their 
suppliers. Its focus on codes of conduct as the way to operationalise retailers’  
extended responsibilities was in line with international thinking at this time in both the 
garment and other consumer industries. Throughout this stage of the process the 
unions attended SCCC meetings and were part of the core SCCC working group, but 
remained passive in terms of offering suggestions as to how the campaign should 
proceed. 
By the end of 1997, Swedish garment retailers eventually came to 
acknowledge an extended responsibility, to be operationalized through codes of 
conduct. Their rationale for adopting this position was to avoid negative media 
attention and maintain positive perceptions in the eyes of consumers.3 To overcome 
the problems of differences between the retailers’  codes and to achieve credible 
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monitoring, at the end of 1998 the four retailers joined an SCCC project initiated by 
FTC. The project was later labelled by some, though notably not by the unions, as 
‘DressCode’ . We will use this label for the purposes of this paper.  
Act II, 1999–2001: Moving on 
The DressCode project had two objectives: i) to formulate a harmonized code of 
conduct for the four retailers, and ii) to put in place an independent monitoring system 
for this code. Initially, FTC proposed a code consisting of the ILO core conventions, 
the UN human rights declarations, and ‘living wages’ .4 The other NGOs and the 
unions involved in DressCode still remained fairly passive in the process, accepting 
and supporting FTC’ s suggestions. However, the firms were reluctant to accept the 
‘living wages’  concept, and instead argued in favour of ‘minimum wages’ .5 After 
heated discussion, FTC, the other NGOs, and the unions retreated from their original 
position and accepted ‘minimum wages’ , and a harmonised code was agreed upon. 
DressCode’ s next step was to develop an independent monitoring system. 
Over a two-year period the project explored different monitoring systems mainly 
based on NGO-led monitoring. Based on this experience, DressCode’ s project 
manager proposed the creation of an independent foundation that would own a non-
profit organisation that in turn would sell independent monitoring to all interested 
Swedish garment retailers. The foundation would be founded and co-owned by 
Swedish NGOs and unions. Most of these ideas were suggested by FTC and the firms. 
Act III, 2002–2005: Crashing down 
In 2002, the unions decided to reject the suggested code of conduct and monitoring 
system. This was the first time during this six-year process that the unions expressed a 
clear and independent opinion and actively affected SCCC processes, rather than 
simply passively reacting to FTC initiatives. The unions officially presented three 
main reasons for their withdrawal. First, the unions claimed that the suggested code 
was inadequate, since it did not encompass all the ILO conventions. This was a quasi 
argument, since the code did contain all ILO conventions relevant to the garment 
industry and all organisations involved in DressCode seemed willing to include the 
remaining ILO conventions in the developed code. Second, the unions claimed that 
codes of conduct were an unsatisfactory way to operationalise retailers’  extended 
responsibilities towards their suppliers’  workers. The unions instead opted to enter 
into binding global collective agreements with the firms. The unions, at this stage, 
claimed to have initially been too positive towards codes of conduct; they claimed that 
codes were a convenient way for firms to legitimise their supplier relationships 
without any union involvement. Third, the unions claimed not to have the mandate to 
negotiate on behalf of workers at suppliers’  factories in developing countries. The 
unions said that they had initially wanted to improve workers’  situations without 
giving the issue of mandate any thought; later, however, the unions argued that local 
and national unions should negotiate with the firms regarding the terms of the global 
collective agreements. As well, the unions regarded their participation in the 
DressCode project as an opportunity to learn about and evaluate the project’ s 
suggested approach, i.e., codes of conduct and monitoring systems. Hence, it seems 
that the unions discarded codes of conduct as a way to operationalise retailers’  social 
responsibilities and even came to perceive codes of conduct as inhibiting progress 
towards improved workers’  rights at TNCs’  suppliers’  operations. 
After the unions withdrew from DressCode, FTC and the other NGOs decided 
not to create the independent monitoring foundation. The organisations were not 
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comfortable creating a code of conduct and monitoring system without the support of 
the unions. The unions’  withdrawal from DressCode and from the operationalisation 
of supplier responsibilities based on codes of conduct was criticised by FTC, the other 
participating NGOs, and the retailers both unofficially and officially in the Swedish 
media. They argued that the unions had previously supported all the aspects of the 
programme that they later came to criticize. 
The collapse of DressCode meant several steps backwards in terms of 
specifying the responsibilities of garment retailers. Instead of creating a well-defined 
code of conduct and monitoring system supported by NGOs, unions, and firms, the 
situation nearly returned to its 1995 position, with no clear definition of retailers’  
social responsibilities or of how they should be operationalised. 
Epilogue: The international scene revisited 
Since the collapse of DressCode, the garment industry has lacked a unified policy 
regarding its responsibility for workers’  rights at their suppliers. The unions tried to 
persuade the firms to accept their own approach to operationalising responsibility, that 
is, global collective agreements negotiated and monitored by local unions. However, 
the retailers were reluctant to accept global collective agreements, arguing that such 
contracts were unrealistic due to the low membership density and organisational 
characteristics of unions in the countries in which they operated. Therefore, the 
retailers continued to work with codes of conduct and monitoring, each firm 
developing its own code and conducting the monitoring itself. 
Additionally, H&M initiated discussions with the Fair Labor Association 
(FLA) and the Fair Wear Foundation. KappAhl began collaborating with the 
Norwegian Ethical Trading Initiative (IEH), made SA8000 inspections at some of its 
suppliers’  factories, and joined the recently created Business Social Compliance 
Initiative (BSCI) (which Lindex joined as well). These retailers’  initiatives have been 
criticised both by NGOs, for not including harmonized codes and independent 
monitoring, and by unions, for being focused on codes of conduct rather than global 
collective agreements. The public debate and negative media attention related to the 
retailers’  operations has, however, gradually ebbed, and it currently seems that 
consumers and other stakeholders are paying limited attention to issues of retailers’  
responsibilities towards their suppliers’  workers. 
Categorising Union–NGO Relationship Strategies 
First-order strategies: Conflict or co-ordination 
We have earlier framed the union–NGO relationship as a strategic choice of either 
conflict or co-ordination. It is now necessary to further specify these first-order 
strategic choices as they apply to unions and NGOs. Given our previous assumption 
that unions and NGOs share the same final objective of influencing TNCs to broaden 
their responsibility for workers’  rights at their suppliers’  factories, unions and NGOs 
can choose to co-ordinate themselves around a given approach to achieving this final 
objective. They can also each promote conflicting approaches, attempting to achieve 
the final objective unilaterally in competition with each other. Two such approaches 
have appeared in practice: codes of conduct and global agreements. Traditionally, 
NGOs have favoured codes of conduct, while unions have favoured global 
agreements (e.g., Gallin, 2000; Compa, 2004; Connor, 2004). Hence, a co-ordination 
strategy implies that both unions and NGOs will co-operate in promoting either codes 
of conduct or global agreements as the agreed-upon approach, while a conflict 
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strategy implies that one party chooses codes of conduct while the other chooses 
global agreements. Given multilevel negotiations between one TNC and concerned 
unions and NGOs, a mix of codes and agreements is theoretically possible. However, 
as no such bargaining structure has been practically employed (at least not in the 
studied setting), we are not considering this possibility in this paper. 
At first glance, our study would seem to support the findings of previous 
research, that unions are likely to adopt a conflict rather than a co-ordination strategy 
in union/NGO relationships, as the studied project broke down as a direct result of the 
unions unilaterally choosing to defect. The study’ s results also, at first, seem to 
support the notion that NGOs are likely to adopt a co-ordination strategy, illustrated 
by the fact that the NGOs, until the collapse of the joint project, intentionally and 
continuously sought to involve the unions in defining TNC social responsibilities. 
Thus, while the NGOs attempted to co-ordinate with unions around a given approach 
(the NGOs’  favoured codes of conduct), unions unilaterally chose an alternative 
approach, global agreements, without attempting to co-ordinate with NGOs. 
However, viewing the case longitudinally reveals a somewhat different 
picture. Analysing the process over time reveals that for most of the project the unions 
actually chose a co-ordination strategy focussing on codes of conduct. Between 1996 
and 2001, the unions chose to participate in the joint Swedish Clean Clothes 
Campaign and the DressCode project. Consequently, it is misleading to view the 
unions’  subsequent defection as a result of any default preference for a conflict 
strategy. Indeed, the unions’  decision to defect was met with surprise by the other 
project members. Rather, the unions’  strategic preference seems not to have been 
uniform over time, and dependent not so much on principle as on pragmatic 
considerations regarding their mandate and bargaining power vis-à-vis NGOs and 
TNCs. 
Conversely, regarding the NGO behavioural pattern in our studied 
relationship, it does not appear that their selection of a co-ordination strategy was 
based on any default preference. When the unions chose to defect from the DressCode 
project, the NGO response was not to co-operate with them in pursuing their 
alternative solution: global agreements. Instead, the NGOs criticised the unions’  
efforts and their decision to abandon the NGO-initiated project. Since both codes of 
conduct and global agreements aim to achieve the same final objective, application of 
a pure co-ordination strategy would have meant that the NGOs instead should have 
rallied around the unions’  model of co-determination. Hence, the NGOs choice of co-
ordination or conflict strategies seems to be based on their pragmatic interests as well, 
not necessarily related to any specific default preference for a general principle. 
These findings are in contrast to those of most previous union–NGO research, 
which indicate that unions have a default preference for a conflict strategy, while 
NGOs have a default preference for a co-ordination strategy (cf. Traub-Werner and 
Carvey, 2002; Justice, 2003; Anner and Evans, 2004; Braun and Gearhart, 2004; 
Connor, 2004). Instead, we claim that the first-order strategic choice cannot be tied to 
any specific a priori difference between unions and NGOs, but should rather be 
viewed as a consequence of choices made at the organisational level. 
Second-order strategies: Levels of commitment 
Since it seems to be misleading to link unions’  and NGOs’  strategic choices of co-
ordination or conflict to general differences in their preferences, alternative 
approaches to understanding their strategic choices are needed. One such approach is 
to examine the degree of commitment with which unions and NGOs pursue a given 
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course of action. We can gauge the degree of commitment by the allocation of 
financial and personnel resources to the implementation of a given course of action 
(cf. Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and label the chosen level of commitment the 
second-order strategic choice of unions and NGOs. 
In the studied case, it is clear that the unions and NGOs were not investing 
equal amounts of resources in the union–NGO relationship. While the NGOs, in 
particular FTC, invested many working hours in promoting the joint project and 
implementing codes of conduct, the unions combined contributed less than one full 
position to the project. The unions also chose a considerably less active approach to 
the ongoing discussions and negotiations involved in the project, thus committing 
themselves less to the relationship and to the code of conduct approach. These 
tendencies were reinforced by a high turnover of union representatives throughout the 
joint project. However, as unions did defect from the joint project, they have since 
committed themselves to a greater degree to attempt to establish global agreements 
with a number of TNCs. These efforts have been undertaken mainly at the 
international level, with the involvement of so-called Global unions. As this 
happened, the NGOs have chosen to withdraw commitment from their efforts to 
establish codes of conduct while not committing themselves to the unions’  efforts to 
promote global agreements. Thus, NGO commitment has declined from its earlier 
levels. 
It could also be argued that the involved unions did not commit the same 
degree of decision-making power as the NGOs did. For example, the union 
representatives in the project primarily consisted of international secretaries or co-
ordinators, mainly analytical staff functions within unions. In this way, the unions 
were able to maintain a convenient ‘escape’  option, as they were continuously able to 
refer to internal decision-making structures for the necessary mandate to proceed with 
the project. One effect of this was a weaker relationship between unions and NGOs, 
as the cost of defection remained low. 
Thus, the studied case illustrates that union and NGO participation in a co-
ordinated union–NGO relationship cannot by itself serve as evidence of high 
commitment to the relationship or to the project it promotes. Participation could even 
be undertaken for the purpose of learning about or even criticising the project (cf. 
Utting, 2001). Therefore, we conclude that the level of commitment is an important 
yet independent dimension of the union–NGO relationship. Hence, choices of conflict 
or co-ordination, on one hand, and levels of commitment, on the other, should be 
viewed as separate but related dimensions when categorising union–NGO 
relationships. 
Categories of union–NGO relationship strategies 
Having demonstrated that the nature of the union–NGO relationship is determined by: 
i) unions’  and NGOs’  (first-order) strategic choice either to conflict or co-ordinate 
with each other in promoting a given solution, and ii) their level of commitment 
(second-order strategic choice) in the pursuit of a solution, we can distinguish among 
a number of categories of relationship strategies that unions and NGOs may employ. 
Figure 1 depicts the strategic choices available to each union or NGO. 
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Figure 1: Categories of union–NGO relationship strategies 
Four categories of union–NGO relationship strategies emerge. The first strategy, 
truce, has two basic premises: co-ordination to promote a given solution while 
committing few resources to the effort. Also co-ordinated around a solution, but based 
on high levels of commitment, is alliance, the second category of union–NGO 
relationship strategies. In these two categories of relationship strategies, unions and 
NGOs are in agreement regarding the preferred solution. However, the perceived 
importance of these solutions (as described by the level of commitment) varies 
between the strategies. On the other hand, a neglect strategy describes a situation in 
which unions and NGOs pursue conflicting solutions but with a low level of 
commitment. Basically, in this situation unions and NGOs disagree regarding the 
means to achieve their common objectives, and none considers these objectives to be 
important, i.e., the issue of broadening the definition of TNC social responsibility is 
not high on their agendas. Similarly, a war strategy is based on a conflictual strategy 
but differs from neglect by implying high levels of commitment. In short, different 
solutions are actively pursued by the different parties. 
Some comments should be made regarding the interaction among unions and 
NGOs in choosing their respective relationship strategies. First, in our framework, 
both unions and NGOs choose a specific relationship strategy. This means that any 
union–NGO relationship at any particular time consists of a combination of two 
strategies. Second, the unions’  choice of relationship strategy depends on the strategy 
choice of the NGOs, and vice versa. If one party chooses to co-ordinate with the other 
concerning a given solution, the second party’ s chosen strategy will also be co-
ordination (unless, of course, the second party simultaneously alters its preferred 
solution). This occurs regardless of the solution pursued prior to the first party’ s 
choice. One effect of this is that any combination of strategies in a union–NGO 
relationship at a particular time cannot simultaneously consist of both a co-ordination 
and a conflict strategy, as we assume that both parties are co-ordinating or conflicting 
around the same final objective. Either both parties are co-ordinating or both parties 
are in conflict. Finally, the choices of one party along the commitment dimension may 
also influence the choices made by the other party. Investing higher levels of 
commitment may, for example, induce corresponding investments from the second 
party. In short, every action has a reaction. 
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Effects of Union–NGO Relationship Strategies on Corporate 
Responsibility 
We can now start to link the different types of union–NGO relationship strategies to 
expected effects on definitions of TNC social responsibility. In doing this, we will 
grade these effects on a seven-point scale ranging from strongly negative (---) to 
strongly positive (+++), centred around the intermediate value of 0 that denotes an 
average effect on definitions of TNC social responsibility. This said, it should be 
noted that any configuration of union–NGO relationship strategies ranked as having a 
negative effect does not narrow the definition of TNC social responsibilities in any 
absolute sense, but rather in relative terms compared with the expected average effect. 
By configuration of union–NGO relationship strategies we mean any given 
combination of union and NGO strategy choices. Theoretically, 16 such 
configurations of relationship strategies are possible. However, an initial assumption 
made in this paper was that unions and NGOs are more or less equally effective in 
achieving their common final objective. This implies that, for example, a truce–
alliance configuration is identical to an alliance–truce configuration, and hence that 
these configurations are substitutable. This in turn means that we are, in practice, able 
to eliminate six theoretical configurations from the total. Second, since we have 
logically deduced that configurations are either co-ordinated or conflictual (for 
example, an alliance–war configuration is impossible), we are further able to reduce 
the number of relevant configurations by four. This leaves us with six possible 
strategic configurations of relationship strategies: i) truce–truce, ii) truce–alliance, iii) 
alliance–alliance, iv) neglect–neglect, v) neglect–war, and vi) war–war. 
Based on our case study results, we can identify two of these configurations in 
the Swedish Clean Clothes Campaign. Between 1996 and 2001 the unions and NGOs 
employed a truce–alliance strategic configuration, based on a co-ordinated effort but 
with varying degrees of commitment to this effort. Unions displayed low levels of 
commitment while NGOs committed themselves to a higher degree. During this time, 
the definition of TNC social responsibilities broadened. TNCs started to express a 
sense of responsibility for workers’  rights at their suppliers’  factories, created codes of 
conduct, agreed to a harmonised version of these codes, and seemed willing to 
establish a formally independent monitoring system. On the other hand, between 2002 
and 2005 the unions and NGOs employed a neglect–war strategic configuration and 
the definition of TNC social responsibilities promptly narrowed. The definition went 
from a collectively established harmonised code and ‘independent’  monitoring to 
unharmonised codes established by the corporations themselves and non-transparent, 
TNC-controlled monitoring. In 2005, the only component left in the definition of 
TNC social responsibilities (as compared to the initial 1996 definition of no 
responsibility) was an expressed sense of responsibility on the part of TNCs for 
workers’  rights at their suppliers’  factories. Interestingly, in 2005 this was also the 
sole common demand expressed by both unions and NGOs. Hence, the case clearly 
indicates that while even a low-committed co-ordination strategy broadens the 
definition of TNC social responsibilities, a conflict strategy narrows it. 
Having demonstrated how these configurations have appeared in practice, we 
can make some more general propositions regarding each of these configurations, 
with regard to their effect on the definition of TNC social responsibilities. We 
summarise our propositions in Figure 2, in which we have indicated the 
configurations existing in our case with a superscript star (*). 
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Configuration: Effect: Proposition: 
Truce–Truce (+) 
1) A truce–truce configuration leads to a 
mild broadening of the definition of TNC 
responsibilities. 
Truce–Alliance* (++) 
2) A truce–alliance configuration leads to a 
broadening of the definition of TNC 
responsibilities. 
Alliance–Alliance (+++) 
3) An alliance–alliance configuration leads 
to a strong broadening of the definition of 
TNC responsibilities. 
Neglect–Neglect (---) 
4) A neglect–neglect configuration leads to 
a strong narrowing of the definition of TNC 
responsibilities. 
Neglect–War* (--) 
5) A neglect–war configuration leads to a 
narrowing of the definition of TNC 
responsibilities. 
War–War (-) 
6) A war–war configuration leads to a mild 
narrowing of the definition of TNC 
responsibilities. 
 
Figure 2: Propositions regarding the effects of union–NGO relationship strategies on 
definitions of TNC social responsibilities. 
The propositions are derived empirically as well as through deduction. Two of them, 
truce–alliance and neglect–war, are confirmed by our case results. Based on these 
findings, we can reach some preliminary conclusions regarding the four remaining 
configurations. Our arguments regarding commitment are primarily inspired by 
Weinstein’ s (1969) discussion of the concept of commitment in international 
relations. The author demonstrates that disparate commitment on the part of alliance 
partners contributed to the declining cohesion of alliances, and in turn, to the 
exacerbation of international problems. Thus, high levels of commitment lead to 
stronger alliances, which in turn are beneficial to international problems. Below, we 
apply this reasoning in distinguishing between our different propositions. 
In the first configuration – truce–truce – both unions and NGOs commit 
themselves to a lower degree to any given solution, as compared to the truce–alliance 
configuration. As the total level of commitment decreases, it is reasonable to argue 
that the effect on the definition of TNC social responsibilities weakens as well. 
Conversely, the third configuration, alliance–alliance, differentiates itself by having 
both unions and NGOs committing themselves to a high degree. As the total level of 
commitment rises, we believe that it is reasonable to expect an increase in the effect 
on TNC responsibilities. Combined, this leads to our propositions 1–3. 
Employing the same type of argument, we suggest that the fourth 
configuration, neglect–neglect, differentiates itself from our case configuration, 
neglect–war, by having both unions and NGOs committing themselves to a low 
degree. Correspondingly, the sixth configuration, war–war, differentiates itself by 
having both unions and NGOs committing themselves to a high degree. In the first 
case, the total level of commitment decreases while in the second case the level of 
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commitment increases. In both these cases, it is reasonable to argue that the total level 
of commitment is positively correlated with the effect on the definition of TNC social 
responsibilities, i.e., war–war is likely to lead to a smaller (negative) change in the 
definition of TNC responsibilities than are neglect–war and neglect–neglect. This 
reasoning leads to our propositions 4–6. 
However, the reasoning here is less straightforward, especially regarding the 
difference between the fifth and sixth configurations: neglect–war and war–war. 
Countering the argument that higher levels of commitment in a conflictual 
relationship lead to a smaller (negative) effect on the definition of TNC social 
responsibilities than do lower levels of commitment, one could argue that a war–war 
scenario would cause unions and NGOs to consume energy and resources to fight 
each other rather than to promote the broadening of TNC responsibilities. This would 
mean that a war–war configuration would have a stronger narrowing effect on the 
definition of TNC social responsibilities than a neglect–war configuration would, 
which is our suggested proposition. On the other hand, it is also reasonable to claim 
that a war–war configuration might cause unions and NGOs to spur each other on, 
leading to higher pressures on TNCs to broaden the definition of their social 
responsibilities. This would suggest that a war–war configuration might even 
plausibly have a broadening effect on the definition of TNC social responsibilities, 
and not simply a less narrowing effect than other conflictual configurations. 
These propositions should be viewed as preliminary, due to the exploratory 
nature of this paper; however, analysis of union–NGO influence on TNCs lends them 
some support. The power over production in the garment industry (and in other 
industries with low-skilled employees and low investment thresholds) is almost 
entirely possessed by the retailers, i.e., the TNCs (Gereffi, 1994; Traub-Werner and 
Cravey, 2002), since there are high entry barriers on its side of the value chain; 
suppliers located in developing countries, on the other hand, operate under conditions 
of near perfect competition (Traub-Werner and Carvey, 2002). Hence, the bargaining 
power of production workers and unions is limited in comparison to that of the TNCs 
(Braun and Gearhart, 2004; Lipschutz, 2004). In essence, this means that the main 
reason for TNCs to broaden their responsibility for the rights of workers at their 
suppliers is not to secure access to products, but rather to improve their legitimacy, in 
terms of corporate responsibility, in the eyes of their influential Western stakeholders 
(cf. Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Our results indicate that when unions and NGOs co-
operate successfully, they are able to increase their relative bargaining power vis-à-vis 
TNCs, leading to the broadening of definitions of TNC responsibility. One way of 
understanding this would be to recognise that a successful union–NGO relationship 
mobilises important Western stakeholders, thereby making unions and NGOs 
important conduits of legitimacy to various TNC operations and activities (cf. Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and Scott, 1983; Deephouse, 1996; Egels-Zandén and 
Kallifatides, 2005). In short, by working together, unions and NGOs are able to 
determine which TNCs are regarded as legitimate and which are not. In doing that, 
they can exert some degree of control over TNC access to financial resources across 
their value chain. 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we have shown that the union–NGO relationship can be pivotal in 
defining TNC responsibilities. Based on an examination of NGOs’  and unions’  
strategic choices, we have argued that there are four generic categories of union–NGO 
relationship strategies: i) a co-ordinated low-commitment strategy (‘truce’ ), ii) a co-
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ordinated high-commitment strategy (‘alliance’ ), iii) a conflictual low-commitment 
strategy (‘neglect’ ), and iv) a conflictual high-commitment strategy (‘war’ ). We have 
shown how these relationship strategies form six possible strategic configurations of 
the union–NGO relationship and have formulated propositions regarding each of these 
configurations’  effects on the definition of TNC social responsibilities. These 
propositions indicate that co-ordinated union–NGO relationships are generally more 
fruitful for both unions and NGOs than conflictual relationships are. In fact, we would 
suggest that even a low-commitment co-ordinated relationship is more beneficial to 
unions and NGOs than is any form of conflictual relationship, regardless of the level 
of commitment. We are thereby able to confirm the old adage that there are no 
winners in wars. These findings regarding the benefits of co-operation and drawbacks 
of conflict are consistent with the findings of numerous other studies focused more 
broadly on generic concepts of co-operation and conflict (e.g., Smith et al., 1995; 
Nomura and Abe, 2001; Zeng and Chen, 2003; Deery and Iverson, 2005). In sum, not 
only are union–NGO relationships becoming increasingly common, but the way in 
which these relationships are managed is also crucial in attempts to improve workers’  
rights.  
This conclusion has several practical implications. One is that unions and 
NGOs need to improve the preconditions for co-operation, and this requires an 
improved understanding of each others’  characteristics and cultures. This may require 
a more systematic approach to these relationships on the part of both parties than has 
previously been the case. Second, our results suggest that TNCs have an incentive to 
interfere in the union–NGO relationship in order to keep the definition of TNC social 
responsibilities as narrow as possible. Thus, when managing the union–NGO 
relationship it is also necessary to take into consideration subsequent relationships 
with the TNCs involved. 
Given the potential importance of the union–NGO relationship in broadening 
the definition of corporate responsibility, the paper demonstrates that there is a need 
for further research into the union–NGO relationship as related to both workers’  rights 
and other areas of corporate responsibility. The paper also raises several questions for 
future research. First, what type of contextual factors (e.g., industry characteristics, 
regional differences, and political institutions) can be expected to influence the 
relationships outlined in this paper. Second, a more comprehensive theory explaining 
unions’  and NGOs’  strategic choices is needed in order to understand union and NGO 
rationales for choosing a given relationship strategy. Third, there is a need to analyse 
and understand the differences between various approaches to broadening TNC 
responsibility for workers’  rights, e.g., codes of conduct and global agreements, and 
their effects on the level of TNC social responsibility. 
                                                 
1
 This assumption can be questioned. However, we believe that this assumption is as reasonable as any 
alternative assumption. At the very least, no data rejecting our assumption while supporting alternative 
assumptions have been presented.  
2
 In total, H&M, Lindex, KappAhl, and Indiska had a turnover of SEK 64,000 million in 2004 
(approximately USD 9,000 million) and directly employed over 35,000 people worldwide, plus many 
thousands indirectly in their supply chains. 
3
 See, for example, the opinion poll in Expressen (1998-01-15), ‘Var tredje svensk nobbar H&M’  
(translated: Every third Swede is boycotting H&M). 
4
 A ‘living wage’  is the wage level covering all basic needs, though who is to define this level is a 
matter of considerable debate.  
5
 ‘Minimum wage’  is the lowest legal salary level in a country. 
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